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I. 
JURISDICTION 
The judgment that is the subject of this Appeal is a 
final order of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt 
Lake County awarding attorney's fees to Nielsen & Senior, 
attorneys for the Personal Representative for extraordinary 
services rendered in a probate estate (R. pp. 325-326). 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-3 (2)(j) (1953). Pursuant 
to Rule 4-A, Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, this appeal 
was transferred to the Court of Appeals for disposition 
pursuant to an Order of the Supreme Court dated March 28, 
1990. 
The judgment of the District Court was dated December 
19, 1989 (R, pp. 325-26). Notice of Appeal was filed 
January 17, 1990 (R, p. 362). 
II. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. WHETHER THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND 
EXPENSES BY THE TRIAL COURT IS WITHIN THE STATUTORY 
AUTHORITY OF THE TRIAL COURT AND IS SUPPORTED BY THE 
EVIDENCE? 
By law, attorney's fees are to be paid to the 
attorneys for the Personal Representative of a Probate 
estate §75-3-718 and §75-3-719 U.C.A. (1953 as amended) 
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(Add. 1). Findings of fact should be made which support 
the award. Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622 (Utah 1985). 
Only if no evidence is presented or proffered at trial on 
the issue of an award of Attorney's fees is an award of 
attorney's fees an abuse of discretion requiring the award 
to be overturned. Hal Taylor Associates v. Union America, 
Inc., 657 P.2d 743 (Utah 1982). 
2. WHETHER THE AMOUNT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AWARDED 
WAS WITHIN THE SOUND DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL COURT? 
Where there is evidence regarding attorney's fees at 
trial, the amount of attorney's fees to be awarded, are in 
the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be 
disturbed in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion. 
Turtle Management, Inc. v. Haggis Management, Inc., 645 
P.2d 667 (Utah 1982). It is to be presumed that the trial 
court properly exercised its discretion unless the record 
clearly shows to the contrary. Regional Sales Agency v. 
Reichert, 784 P.2d 1210, 1215 (Utah App. 1989). Goddard v. 
Hickman, 685 P.2d 530, 534-535 (Utah 1984). 
3. WHETHER THE COSTS AWARDED BY THE TRIAL COURT FOR 
EXPERT WITNESS FEES, COPYING, ETC., ARE "EXPENSES AND 
DISBURSEMENTS" WHICH ARE TO BE PAID FROM THE PROBATE 
ESTATE? 
Expenses and disbursements of a Personal 
Representative, including but not limited to attorney's 
fees and costs, are to be paid from the probate estate. 
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§75-3-719 (1953 as amended) (Add.l). 
4. WHETHER FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
MADE ORALLY BY THE TRIAL COURT AND RECORDED IN OPEN COURT 
FOLLOWING THE CLOSE OF THE EVIDENCE BUT WHICH ARE NOT 
REPEATED IN THE WRITTEN ORDER WHERE THE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
APPEAR ARE SUFFICIENT? 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law made orally 
and recorded in open court are sufficient without more. 
Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
III. 
STATUTES AND ORDINANCES 
75-3-101 U.C.A. (1953 as amended 1975) - See Addendum 1 
75-3-106 U.C.A. (1953 as amended 1975) - See Addendum 1 
75-3-705 U.C.A. (1953 as amended 1977) - See Addendum 1 
75-3-707 U.C.A. (1953 as amended 1975) - See Addendum 1 
75-3-715 U.C.A. (1953 as amended 1975) - See Addendum 1 
75-3-718 U.C.A. (1953 as amended 1977 & 1987)See Addendum 1 
75-3-719 U.C.A. (1953 as amended 1975) - See Addendum 1 
75-3-805 U.C.A. (1953 as amended 1975) - See Addendum 1 
75-3-808 U.C.A. (1953 as amended 1975) - See Addendum 1 
78-2-3(2)(j) U.C.A. (1953) - See Addendum 1 
Rule 52(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure-See Addendum 1 
Rule 54(d)(1) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure-See Addendum 1 
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IV. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Statement of the Case as set forth by the Appellant 
contains many statements and allegations more properly 
characterized as argument, and therefore, a new Statement 
of the Case is made as follows: 
A. Nature of the Case. Kipp Quinnf Appellant, 
hereinafter referred to as "Kipp", who is not related to 
the decedent, the Successor Personal Representative of> the 
Estate of Fenton Glade Quinn, Sr., hereinafter referred to 
as "Glade", appeals the award of attorney's fees and 
expenses to the attorneys for the former Personal 
Representative, Fenton Glade Quinn, Jr., hereinfter 
referred to as "Fenton", the decedent's son and Respondent 
herein. The only issue at the trial was the proper amount 
of attorney's fees and Personal Representative's expenses 
and disbursements to be awarded. Attorney's fees and 
expenses were awarded in the amounts of (a) $24,181.00 and 
$340.32, respectively, for the Administration of the 
Estate, (b) $20,706.00 and $3,952.60, respectively, for 
legal services rendered Fenton and the Estate in defending 
a claim for $650,000.00 and the resulting legal action for 
wrongful death which resulted in a judgment against the 
Estate for $200,000.00 less than asserted on the claim, and 
(c) $6,781.00 and $184.32, respectively, for legal 
representation of the Estate in litigation against Penny 
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McGrath, a debtor of the Estate, which resulted in a 
recovery by the Estate of over $75,000.00. 
B. Course of Proceeding, The Proceeding out of which 
this appeal arises was commenced by Petition for 
Compensation of Attorneys and Reimbursement of Expenses in 
Estate Litigation filed October 10, 1989 by Nielsen & 
Senior, attorneys for Fenton as Personal Representative of 
the Estate (R. p. 34). Only the Proceeding of this 
Petition is now before this Court. Other, independent 
proceedings, as defined in §75-3-106(1)(a) U.C.A. (1953 as 
amended) (Add. 1), conducted in Glade's Estate included: 
(a) Petition for Determination of Intestacy and Fenton1s 
Appointment as Personal Representative, filed June 12, 1984 
(R. p. 34), (b) Petition for Supervised Administration and 
Order Enjoining the Waste of Assets (R. p. 34), filed 
September 14, 1984 by Kipp which was denied, (c) Petition 
For Order Determining That Fenton Quinn Predeceased Dawana 
Quinn for Purposes of Heirship, and Distribution of Glade's 
Estate filed by Kipp on August 10, 1984 (R. p. 43). After 
several appearances by counsel and extensive efforts to 
prepare for the trial set on the Petition (R. p. 55), 
Kipp's Petition was denied as a matter of law for stating a 
claim upon which relief could not be granted (R. p. 134), 
(d) Petition for Order Restraining Personal Representative 
filed by Kipp on September 28, 1984 (R. p. 51) which was 
denied, (e) Wrongful Death action commenced by Kipp for 
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damages resulting from the death of his mother, (f) 
Petition by Kipp filed on October 25, 1988 to remove Fenton 
during the pendency of Fenton1s appeal of the Wrongful 
Death action, (g) Petition for allowance of Personal 
Representative's fees filed by Fenton which was denied (R. 
p. 352), (h) Petition for Allowance of Exempt Property 
filed by Fenton which is still pending (R. p. 359), (i) 
Petition filed by Kipp on August 18, 1989, for 
Determination of Attorney's Fees (R. p. 205). 
C. Disposition at Trial, Following the trial on 
November 7, 1990 before the Honorable Scott Daniels of the 
Third District Court sitting without a Jury on the sole 
issue of attorney's fees and expenses and disbursements, 
the Court in open court, entered its findings of fact (R. 
pp. 114-117), and awarded Nielsen & Senior, attorneys for 
Fenton as Personal Representative of the Estate: $24,181.00 
attorney's fees and $340.32 costs in the Administration of 
the Estate, $20,706.00 attorney's fees and $3,952.60 costs 
in the defense by the Estate of the Wrongful Death action, 
and $6,781.00 attorney's fees and $184.32 costs in Fenton's 
lawsuit against Penny McGrath for recovery of debts due to 
the Estate. (T. pp. 115-117) No award of attorney's fees 
or costs was made for the legal services rendered in 
Fenton's appeal of the Wrongful Death judgment in which the 
Estate was not successful and for which $6,560.50 fees and 
$353.10 costs had been requested. The Order entered by the 
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trial court stated that the fees and costs were to have 
priority as a cost or expense of Administration of the 
Estate (R. p. 325). 
D. Relevant Facts, Fenton was appointed Personal 
Representative of Glade's Estate, without objection or 
contest, on June 27, 1984 (R. p. 18). 
Kipp's claim against the Estate for $650,000.00 was 
disallowed (R. p. 104), and Kipp filed a Wrongful Death 
action in which judgment was entered against the Estate* for 
about $200,000.00 less than the claim filed by Kipp. The 
Estate subsequently filed an appeal. 
During the pendency of the appeal, the Estate commenced 
an action against Penny McGrath, to recover debts due to 
the Estate, and Kipp filed a Petition to remove Fenton as 
Personal Representative and to appoint himself. (R. p. 
175). Kipp was denied appointment as Personal 
Representative, and Fenton continued to serve (R. p. 190). 
On April 18, 1989, this Court entered its decision 
denying Fenton1s appeal. (R. p. 323). Kipp was appointed 
Successor Personal Representative on June 20, 1989 (R. p. 
197) . 
The Petition in this Proceeding requested compensation 
for legal services and expenses in regard to: (a) the 
Administration of the Estate, (b) the McGrath lawsuit, (c) 
the Wrongful Death action and, (d) Appeal of the judgment 
in the Wrongful Death matter (R. pp. 214-317; T. p. 8). 
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The original value of the Estate was estimated to be 
about $600,000.00 (R. p. 42). Very fewf if any, of Glade's 
records were available to Fenton from which to prepare an 
accurate inventory (T. pp. 78, 80, 81, 83). Glade's home 
and its contents were in Kipp's sole possession. (T. pp. 
81, 95 & 96). Fenton was denied access to the records (T. 
pp. 43, 78, 80, & 81). Judge T. Hansen ordered Fenton to 
deliver an Inventory to Kipp (R. p. 184) which he did. A 
previous Inventory had been prepared but not filed, and-the 
supplementary Inventory showing the revised market values 
as of the date of the decedent's death as required by §75-
3-707 U.C.A. (1953, as amended) (Add. 1) was delivered and 
filed by Fenton in 1988 (R. p. 78). 
Fenton retained Nielsen & Senior to assist him in the 
Estate Administration and Estate litigation on an hourly 
basis measured by the rate of the attorney performing the 
services (T. pp. 52 & 79). If the Estate was complicated, 
it was understood that the statutory fee was not a cap on 
fees (T. p. 52). 
Nielsen & Senior filed its only application for 
compensation with its Petition. No other statements were 
ever submitted to the Court for approval. (T. p. 16). 
VI. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The presence of economic gain, i.e. "benefit", to 
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the estate as a result of legal services is not something 
the Court must consider in making its award of attorney's 
fees and expenses and disbursements. No evidence was 
introduced at the trial that the Personal Representative 
failed to act in good faith at any time nor that he failed 
to perform his duties as Personal Representative. The 
testimony at trial of the attorneys who actually performed 
the legal services for the Personal Representative as to 
the complexity of the Estate, the difficulty* of 
administering the estate, the reasonableness of the hours 
spent in rendering legal services to the Personal 
Representative, the expertise and experience of the 
attorney involved, the fee customarily charged in the 
community for similar services, and the original estimate 
of the size of the estate, together with the detailed 
statement of each item of work performed and the time 
expended thereon and the amounts charged with respect 
thereto provided to the trial court at the trial, and the 
testimony of the Personal Representative at trial are all 
that are necessary for the trial court to make a 
determination of a reasonable attorney's fee. 
The trial court heard the evidence but did not believe 
Kipp's allegations that Fenton acted improperly to deprive 
the creditors and made a proper award of attorney's fees 
and expenses and disbursements. 
2. Comparisons of attorney fees to the size of the 
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probate estate are improper in a very complexf difficult, 
and unusual estate. The Court considered all of the 
relevant factors necessary to make a sound decision after 
hearing the witnesses' testimony and reviewing the detailed 
billing statements introduced at the trial and judging the 
credibility thereof. 
3. Awards of all expenses and disbursements of the 
Personal Representative in administering the estate and 
prosecuting and defending proceedings are specifically 
authorized by statute. A Personal Representative's 
expenses and disbursements includes not only "costs" as the 
term "costs" is used in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
but also many other things. The Trial Court acted properly 
in its award of the expenses and disbursements. 
4. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered 
by the Court either in writing or orally in open court 
where they were recorded are sufficient to sustain its 
award of attorney's fees and expenses and disbursements, 
VII. 
ARGUMENT 
ISSUE 1 
WHETHER THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND EXPENSES BY THE 
TRIAL COURT IS WITHIN THE STATUTORY AUTHORITY OF THE TRIAL 
COURT AND IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE? 
A Personal Representative is not personally liable on 
contracts entered into as a Personal Representative. §75-
-10-
3-808(1) U.C.A. (1953 as amended) (Add. 1). The Estate of 
the decedent is liable, §75-3-808(3) (1953 as amended) 
(Add, l)r and any successor Personal Representative is duty 
bound by the contracts of his predecessor. §75-3-808(3) 
and §75-3-715 U.C.A. (1953 as amended) (Add.l). 
§75-3-718 U.C.A. (1953 as amended) (Add. 1), prior to 
Amendment, provided that the Personal Representative's 
attorney was entitled to reasonable compensation for 
services, but not to exceed the amounts set forth in-the 
statutory fee schedule for a normal probate. Additional 
attorney's fees deemed just and reasonable by the Court 
could be awarded for extraordinary services. As amended, 
the statute now provides that attorney's are entitled to 
reasonable compensation for services, (Add. 1). 
§75-3-719 U.C.A. (1953 as amended) (Add. 1) requires 
that the Estate of the decedent pay all necessary expenses 
and disbursements, including reasonable attorney's fees of 
the Personal Representative if he defends or prosecutes any 
proceeding in good faith, whether successful or not. 
The foregoing statutes both authorize an award of 
attorney's fees and expenses for services rendered in 
Probate Proceedings. The only statutory standards are: 
reasonableness in amount and good faith on the part of the 
Personal Representative in deciding to defend or to 
prosecute which are questions of fact to be determined by 
the trial court. Regional Sales Agency v. Reichert, 784 
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P.2d 1210, 1215 (Utah App. 1989), Goddard v. Hickman, 685 
P.2d 530, 534-535 (Utah 1984). 
The old "benefit to the estate" test became obsolete 
when the legislature enacted these statutes unless 20/20 
hindsight following an unsuccessful prosecution or defense 
manages to equate unsuccessful with bad faith. It seems 
inconceivable that successful prosecution or defense would 
ever be regarded as bad faith. 
At the conclusion of the trial in these Proceedings-and 
after having heard all of the evidence relating to the fees 
for legal services rendered in connection with the 
Administration of the Estate, the Court found that: (a) 
this was an exceptionally unusual Estate; (b) that 
decedents [Glade and Dawana] died at the same time; (c) 
that there was a lack of records; (d) that there was 
animosity generated between the heirs of the two Estates; 
and (e) that the complexity of the Estate justified an 
award of $24,181.00 fees andv$340.32 costs for the services 
rendered in the Estate Administration (T. pp. 114 & 115). 
Based upon the proffer of evidence on the issue and the 
testimony of the attorneys who worked on the matters 
involved that the work was necessary, beneficial to the 
Estate, and reasonable in the amount of time spent, items 
of work performed, and in terms of amount, and that the 
rates charged were reasonable based upon the experience and 
expertise of the attorneys involved and the time and place 
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in the Salt Lake City market (T. pp. 9 & 10), the court 
made its decision, 
Kipp's attorney had full opportunity to call witnesses 
and to cross-examine the attorneys who worked on the 
various Proceedings which produced the following 
uncontradicted testimony: 
(a) The value of the decedent's estate at the outset was 
reasonably believed to be between $500,000.00 and 
$600,000.00, (T. p. 42). Kipp now complains that no 
breakdown was given, but his attorney did not ask for one, 
and cannot now be heard to complain about his own failure. 
Associated Industrial Development, Inc. v. Jewkes, 701 P.2d 
486, 489 (Utah 1984). 
(b) All of the records were in the possession of Kipp 
(T. pp. 43, 81 83, 95 & 96), and only some were produced as 
a result of discovery by Fenton's attorneys (T. p. 43). 
(c) The circumstances surrounding the deaths were 
unclear. Fenton had received information which required 
investigation that the decedents had entered into a suicide 
pact. (T. p. 44). 
(d) Kipp filed a Petition requesting that the Court 
Order that all of Glade's Estate passed to Dawana as a 
matter of law (T. p. 44) (R. 43). The matter was set for 
a speedy trial, and it was necessary to prepare extensively 
for that trial. A Court Order was required to get 
information from the police (T. pp. 45 & 46). 
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(e) The Cadillac which belonged to the Estate and which 
Fenton had in his possession was taken without Fenton's 
knowledge by Kipp's brother, Kelly, and was believed stolen 
which required legal assistance (T. p. 46). While Kelly 
had the car, it was repossessed by the bank and sold in a 
questionable manner (T. p. 47). 
(f) Extensive efforts were made to get income tax 
information and records but they did not seem to exist. 
All of the records were kept in the decedent's home. - (T. 
p. 48). The home and its contents were in the possession 
of Kipp. (T. pp. 95 & 96). 
(g) A Complaint was filed by an alleged creditor of the 
Estate, Menlove, beyond the statutory period for filing 
claims on the theory that it involved insurance coverage. 
Legal services were rendered in connection with that legal 
action (T. pp. 50 & 51). 
(h) The Estate appeared to be insolvent due to the many 
claims filed. (T. pp. 49 & 50). Kipp filed at least three 
different claims (R. pp. 32, 33, 83, 98) all of which were 
disallowed by Fenton (T. pp. 81, 104). Kipp only took 
further action on one of the three claims. 
(i) The home was threatened with foreclosure, but even 
after a qualified buyer with the funds to purchase the home 
was located, Kipp threatened to not cooperate in the sale 
and to allow the Trustee on the Trust Deed to foreclose 
upon the home unless his unresonable demands were met (T. 
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p. 54), Legal services were rendered assisting Fenton in 
meeting those demands without violating his fiduciary duty 
to the others who had an interest in the Estate (T. p. 54). 
(j) Many extra appearances had to be made in connection 
with the Estate which are not required in a normal probate 
due to Kippfs constant interference (T. p. 65). 
(k) The testimony given of specific occurranees which 
required legal assistance covered only part of the unusual 
things which occurred in the Estate Admiinistration (T- p. 
52) . 
The testimony regarding the unusual nature and 
complexity of the Estate Administration was that of a 
qualified, expert witness (T. pp. 64 & 65). In addition to 
the Estate Administration, testimony was given regarding 
legal services rendered in the Wrongful Death litigation 
and the McGrath litigation. 
It is the testimony of the attorneys claiming the fees 
which is most valuable and relevant. Associated Industrial 
Development, Inc. v. Jewkes, 701 P.2d 486, 488 & 489 (Utah 
1984), and the Court heard that testimony. The 
reasonableness of the fee to be awarded in regard to a 
Probate is a matter which is primarily within the peculiar 
knowledge and sound discretion of the Trial Court. In Re 
Smith's Estate, 162 P.2d 105, 111 (Utah 1945). The amount 
awarded as attorney's fees is within the sound discretion 
of the Trial Court, and unless there is a clear abuse of 
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discretion, the amount of the award by the trial court will 
not be disturbed. Turtle Management, Inc. v. Haggis 
Management, 645 P.2d 667, 671 (Utah 1982). 
Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P. 2d 622 (Utah 1985), provides 
at pp. 624 and 625 that: 
flA court may consider, among other factors, the 
difficulty of the litigation, the efficiency of the 
attorneys in presenting the case, the reasonableness 
of the number of hours spent on the case, the fee 
customarily charged in the locality for similar 
services, the amount involved in the case and the 
result attained, and the expertise and experience of 
the attorneys involved.11 
These factors were placed into evidence and were considered 
by the Court in finding the fees awarded to be reasonable 
(T. pp. 114 through 117). 
In regard to the Wrongful Death action, the evidence was 
that the amount claimed was $650,000.00 (T. p. 27), that 
the amount awarded was nearly $200,000.00 less the amount 
claimed (T. p. 30), and that Fenton offered to settle with 
Kipp for the value of all of the Estate's assets, prior to 
trial but that Kipp demanded a settlement of $200,000.00 
(T. pp. 29 & 94). Specifically, the Court found that 
Fenton's offer to settle for the total value of the Estate 
was reasonable under the circumstances, that the offer was 
unreasonably rejected, and that Dawana's heirs were at 
least as unreasonable as Glade's heirs (T. p. 116). Based 
upon the fact that a fair offer was made by the Estate and 
only due to that, the Court awarded $20,706.00 attorney's 
fees and $3,952.60 costs. (T. pp. 116 & 117). 
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The Court also found the $6,781.00 fees and $184.32 
costs incurred in connection with the McGrath litigation to 
be reasonable. (T. p. 115). This finding was supported 
not only by the testimony of the attorneys who worked on 
the case, but also the admission of Kipp and his attorney 
that the work performed on McGrath was necessary and 
contributed to the benefit of the Estate. (T. pp. 85, 108 
Si 109) . 
Fenton's failure to file an Inventory until 198& is 
immaterial. An Inventory was prepared by Fenton at the 
beginning of the probate which reflected, to the best of 
the information then available to Fenton, the assets in the 
Estate and their values. (T. p. 78). Kipp, not Fenton, was 
in possession of all of Glade's property and papers and had 
them from the time of Glade's death, including the stock 
and other things which Fenton believed his father owned (T. 
pp. 81 & 83). Kipp had possession of the decedent's home 
and contents at all times. (T. pp. 95 & 96). 
§75-3-705 U.C.A. (1953 as amended) (Add. 1) requires 
only that an Inventory be prepared. There is no statutory 
requirement that the Inventory be filed, nor is it a breach 
of duty to fail to file one. Filing was optional until 
Fenton was ordered otherwise. Then he filed the most 
recent version of the Inventory which showed the revised 
market values and descriptions based upon the information 
which he had been able to gather up to that time as 
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required by §75-3-707 U.C.A. (1953 as amended) (Add., 1). 
It does not reflect all of the property Fenton believed 
Glade owned at his death since he had been unable to get 
any other documents from Kipp to prove Glade's ownership 
(R. pp. 43, 78, 80 & 81) . 
Fenton was not removed as Personal Representative for 
dereliction of his duty to prepare an Inventory, but only 
because it appeared to the court at that time, in other, 
separate, independent Proceedings that Fenton may have 
(emphasis added), improvidently incurred legal expenses and 
costs of approximately $73,000.00. That is $17,000.00 more 
than was finally awarded by the same Judge following the 
trial in these Proceedings (R. p. 190). $17,000.00 is a 
significant difference. Kipp had his day in court and 
failed to produce any credible testimony at trial to 
support his wild allegations. In light of the fact that no 
fees or costs or expenses were awarded for the appeal (T. 
p. 117) it appears that the logical explanation of the 
court's action in removing Fenton in the prior, independent 
Proceedings is that it based its prior decision only upon 
Fenton's incurring attorney's fees and expenses for his 
appeal of the Wrongful Death Judgment. The trial court's 
acted consistently in both Proceedings. 
In making its award of attorney's fees and expenses, the 
trial court also had a description of each item of work 
performed by the attorneys, the time required to perform 
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each item of workf and the date upon which the services 
were performed (R. pp. 219-317). It is exactly such 
accounting records which can substantiate the award of 
attorney's fees. IFG Leasing Co. v. Gordon, 776 P.2d 607, 
608 (Utah 1989). 
Although the fee for a normal probate of a $90,000.00 
estate in which there was no litigation under the old fee 
schedule was about $3,600.00, this Estate had extensive 
litigation and was far from normal. The Court found that 
it was "...an exceptionally unusual estate..." (T. p. 114). 
The decision of the Trial Court is authorized by statute 
and fully supported by the evidence at trial. 
ISSUE 2 
WHETHER THE AMOUNT OF ATTORNEY FEES AWARDED WAS WITHIN 
THE SOUND DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL COURT? 
The Trial Court, as the trier of fact, considered the 
relationship of the fee to the complexity and exceptionally 
unusual nature of the probate, the novelty and difficulty 
of the issues involved, and the fact that the trial on the 
Wrongful Death matter was forced upon Fenton by the 
unreasonable demand of Kipp and his brothers that the 
Estate settle for more than the then determined value of 
all of the Estate assets (T. pp. 114-117). 
Attorney's fees "...when awarded as allowed by law, are 
awarded as a matter of legal right...", and the total 
amount of attorney's fees awarded in a case cannot be said 
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to be unreasonable as a result of a comparison of those 
fees to the amounts involved. Cabrera v. Cotrell, 694 
P.2d 622, 625 (Utah 1985). This Court said: "We will 
presume that the discretion of the trial court was properly 
exercised unless the record clearly shows the contrary." 
Regional Sales Agency v. Reichert, 784 P.2d 1210, 1215 
(Utah App. 1989), (quoting Goddard v. Hickman, 685 P.2d 
530, 534-535 (Utah 1984) [quoting State ex rel Road Comm'n 
v. General Oil Co., 22 Utah 2d 60, 62, 448 P.2d 718, 719 
(Utah 1987) ] . 
As discussed above, the test of whether proceedings 
prosecuted or defended by the Personal Representative 
benefit the Estate economically or otherwise is no longer 
determinative but is now only one of many factors to be 
taken into account in determining whether or not a 
prosecution or defense was undertaken in good faith. Even 
then, the weight to be given the issue of benefit is 
questionable since benefit necessarily requires an element 
of success, and successful prosecution or defense is 
specifically not required under §75-3-719 U.C.A. (1953 as 
amended) (Add. 1). 
Dennett v. First Security Bank, N.A., 439 P.2d 459 (Utah 
1968) which was decided well before the adoption of the 
Utah Uniform Probate Code is distinguishable on its facts, 
and most, if not all, of the statements made therein,, are 
no longer true under current Utah law. For example, the 
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assets of an estate belong not to the creditors but to the 
decedent's heirs subject to, among other things, the 
intervening rights of creditors under §75-3-101 U.C.A. 
(1953 as amended) (Add. 1). 
There was no evidence at the trial that Fenton acted in 
bad faith in defending or prosecuting any matters, nor that 
there was any intent on the part of anyone to incur such 
large legal fees as to deprive the creditors of any 
compensation. These Proceedings are totally independent of 
prior Proceedings. Consistent with the fact that the Court 
previously thought that $73,000.00 may have been 
improvidently incurred, it did not award $73,000.00. It 
awarded $17,000.00 less, which is a significant difference. 
In Re Estate of Smith, 426 P.2d 575 (Montana 1967) in 
which the Order of the trial court as to the amount of 
attorney fees awarded was affirmed, was decided under the 
law of Montana which was very different than the Utah 
Uniform Probate Code. The facts are totally different from 
the facts in this case except that the initial Personal 
Representative was removed. Mrs. Smith, the 
Administratrix, failed to obtain a routine determination of 
heirship for two years, and as a result the estate lost the 
interest on $260,000.00 during that time. Her failure to 
render accountings and file an inventory were violations of 
Montana law. The hardships suffered by the Smith estate 
were loss of interest on $260,000.00 for two years, loss of 
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tax benefits, and imposition of tax penalties. In this 
case there is no evidence of loss of interest, violation of 
Utah law, loss of tax benefits, imposition of tax penalties 
or any other hardship to Glade's Estate, Further, Mr. 
Smith's debts of $15,000,00 were small in relation to the 
size of the Estate, whereas the debts in Glade's Estate 
were very large. 
Kipp produced no evidence that he spent $20,000.00 in 
"correcting and supervising" Fenton. Instead, it appears 
that those were the attorney's fees spent by Kipp in 
prosecuting the Wrongful Death action. (T. p. 94). The 
Court examined the portions of the statement of Kipp's 
attorney which it was given and determined that the 
services performed by Kipp's attorney and Fenton's 
attorneys were not comparable and that the fees awarded for 
the Estate Administration were not unreasonable (T. p. 
115) . 
Fenton had a fiduciary duty to defend the estate and its 
other creditors from the excessive claims and improper 
petitions filed by Kipp. There is nothing in the record to 
show, much less clearly show, that the trial court 
improperly exercised its discretion. The attorney's fees 
awarded were within the sound discretion of the trial court 
which heard the evidence, saw the witnesses as they 
testified, and was in a position to judge the credibility 
of the testimony and evidence given. 
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ISSUE 3 
WHETHER THE COSTS AWARDED BY THE TRIAL COURT FOR EXPERT 
WITNESS FEES, COPYING, ETC. ARE "EXPENSES AND 
DISBURSEMENTS" WHICH ARE TO BE PAID FROM THE PROBATE 
ESTATE? 
§75-3-719 U.C.A. (1953 as amended) (Add. 1) requires 
that the Estate of the decedent pay all necessary expenses 
and disbursements of the Personal Representative in 
defending or prosecuting any proceeding in good faith. The 
term "costs" which is used in Rule 54(d)(1) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure (Add. 1) and discussed by the Utah 
Supreme Court in Morgan v. Morgany 137 Ut. Adv. Rep. 35 
(June 29, 1990) and defined in Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 
771 (Utah 1980)/ does not appear in the Probate statute. 
Neither of the cases cited involve a probate, and both deal 
with the definition of "costs" as used in the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure and not with "expenses and disbursements" 
which would seem broad enough to include expenditures for 
anything reasonably related to the proceedings. 
The expenses the Estate was ordered to pay were $340.32 
in the administration of the Estate (R. pp. 259 through 
261) which involved a number of Proceedings (T. pp. 41-65), 
$184.32 in the McGrath litigation (R. pp. 278 & 279), and 
$3,952.60, $3,604.00 of which was an expert witness fee, in 
the wrongful death litigation (R. pp. 305 & 306). 
Because a Personal Representative is not personally 
liable for obligations incurred in the capacity of a 
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Personal Representative under §75-3-808 U.C.A. (1953 as 
amended) 
(Add. 1) , the probate estate must be liable for the 
expenses and disbursements incurred in defending or 
prosecuting Proceedings. §75-3-808 and §75-3-719 U.C.A. 
(1953 as amended). The obligation of the Estate to pay is 
not limited to "reimbursement" of those expenditures for 
which the Personal Representative is personally liable 
since the Personal Representative is never personally 
liable. Otherwise, no Personal Representative, acting as 
such, would ever be able to defend or prosecute any action 
and would have no alternative but to roll over and play 
dead whenever a claim was asserted regardless of whether or 
not the claim was legitimate or reasonable in amount« No 
one would undertake to represent the Personal 
Representative in contesting the claim since expenses are 
always incurred in contesting claims, such as fees of 
expert witnesses in good faith believed to be necessary to 
defend, for example, a wrongful death action. All of the 
reasonably necessary expenses of the Personal 
Representative are to be paid by the probate Estate when 
the defense or prosecution is undertaken in good faith. 
The trial court found that Fenton acted in good faith in 
proceeding with the trial on the Wrongful Death when his 
fair offer was rejected (T. pp. 116 & 117) rather than 
suffer a default judgment for $650,000.00. Expenses were 
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incurred in the Wrongful Death action where the major issue 
was the economic damage to three adult children (T. p. 40), 
in regard to which only the testimony of an expert witness 
was competent and admissable. 
The issue of liability for an expense as between the 
Estate and Personal Representative is to be determined in 
an appropriate proceeding relating to the administration of 
the Estate as was done in this case. §75-3-808(4) U.C.A. 
(1953 as amended) (Add. 1). 
Dennett v. First Security Banky N.A., 439 P.2d 459 
(1968)/ does not apply here for two reasons. First, it is 
distinguishable on its facts and deals only with a 
contingent attorney fee claimed in lieu of the fee awarded 
by the trial court, not expenses and disbursements nor 
costs. Second, it was decided prior to the adoption of the 
Utah Uniform Probate Code, which made its reasoning and 
the law cited therein obsolete in Utah. 
All of the expenses awarded by the trial court related 
to Fenton's uncontested appointment based upon his 
statutory priority or to Proceedings which occurred while 
he was serving as Personal Representative. Expenses and 
disbursements are paid as an administration expense under 
§75-3-805(1)(b) U.C.A. (1953 as amended) (Add. 1) and were 
not set off against the amount of the claim established in 
the Wrongful Death litigation. The fact that the expenses 
of the Personal Representative at the trial, including 
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attorney's fees, would, by law, be paid from the Estate 
before any claims established at the trial were paid must 
have been considered by Kipp and his counsel before they 
unreasonably rejected Fenton's reasonable, good faith offer 
of settlement prior to trial (T. pp. 29, 94). 
The evidence at trial supports the fact that Fenton 
acted in good faith in all matters for which sums were 
awarded for necessary expenses and disbursements. The fact 
that the result of applying the statutory law is that-* the 
amounts remaining to be distributed to creditors is reduced 
by the amount of the necessary expenses and disbursements 
is merely a consequence of the legislative scheme, is 
specifically authorized by statute, and can only be 
remedied by the Utah State Legislature. 
ISSUE 4 
WHETHER FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW MADE 
ORALLY BY THE TRIAL COURT AND RECORDED IN OPEN COURT 
FOLLOWING THE CLOSE OF THE EVIDENCE BUT WHICH ARE NOT 
REPEATED IN THE WRITTEN ORDER ARE SUFFICIENT? 
Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (Add. 1) 
provides in pertinent part: 
"It shall be sufficient if the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in 
open court following the close of the evidence or 
appear in an opinion or memorandum decision filed by 
the court." 
The trial court stated its findings of fact and 
conclusions of law orally, and they were recorded in open 
court following the close of the evidence (T. pp. 114-
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117). The findings of fact stated are adequate to support 
the decision of the trial court. 
The trial court considered the factors discussed in 
Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622, 624f 625 (Utah, 1985), 
and in accord with Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336, 1338 
(Utah, 1979) the court made findings on all material 
issues. The facts in the record are clear, uncontroverted, 
and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the 
judgment. The only issue at trial was whether the attocney 
fees and expenses for the four categories of legal work 
performed were reasonable (T.p. 114). Kipp produced no 
competent evidence at trial to the contrary. The 
Conclusions of Law were adequately stated and recorded in 
open court (T. pp. 115-117). The Order requiring that the 
current Personal Representative pay from the assets of the 
Estate the amounts awarded as a cost and expense of 
administration is proper and in accord with §75-3-718, §75-
3-719, and §75-3-808 U.C.A. (1953 as amended) (Add. 1). 
In any event, even if there had been a failure to enter 
findings of fact and conclusions of law it does not require 
reversal of the judgment. If the findings and conclusions 
are such that it is impossible to review the issues without 
M
... invading the trial court's fact-finding domain...", 
the judgment would be merely vacated, and the case remanded 
for further proceedings, and the scope of the further 
proceedings would be limited to the entry of proper 
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findings of fact and conclusions of law by the trial court. 
Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah, 1987). 
The findings of fact and conclusions of law are 
sufficient to allow appellate review, and the decision of 
the trial court should be sustained. 
VIII. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent, Fenton Glade Quinn, Jr., requests that 4:his 
Court sustain the judgment of the Trial Court in this 
matter. 
Respectfully submitted this /Q^2- day of /y/^du^ #-
1990. 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
IT. Kent Ludlow I 
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Addendum 1 
75-3-101. Devolution of estate at death—Restrictions.—The power 
of a person to leave property by will and the rights of creditors, devisees, 
and heirs to his property are subject to the restrictions and limitations 
contained in this code to facilitate the prompt settlement of estates. Upon 
the death of a person his real and personal property devolves to persons 
to whom it is devised by his last will or to those indicated as substitutes 
for them in cases involving lapse, renunciation, or other circumstances 
affecting the devolution of testate estate, or in the absence of testamen-
tary disposition, to his heirs, or to those indicated as substitutes for 
them in cases involving renunciation or other circumstances affecting 
devolution of intestate estates, subject to homestead allowance, exempt 
property and family allowance, rights of creditors, elective share of the 
surviving spouse, and administration. 
History: C. 1953, 75-3-101, enacted 
by L. 1975, ch. 150, § 4. 
75-3-106. Scope of proceedings—Proceedings independent—Excep-
tion.—(1) Unless supervised administration as described in part 5 of 
this chapter is involved: 
(a) Each proceeding before the court or registrar is independent 
of any other proceeding involving the same estate. 
(b) Petitions for formal orders of the court may combine various 
requests for relief in a single proceeding if the orders sought may be 
finally granted without delay. Except as required for proceedings which 
are particularly described by other sections of this chapter, no petition 
is defective because it fails to embrace all matters which might then be 
the subject of a final order. 
(c) Proceedings for probate of wills or adjudications of no will may 
be combined with proceedings for appointment of personal representa-
tives. 
(d) A proceeding for appointment of a personal representative is 
concluded by an order making or declining the appointment. 
History: C. 1953, 75-3-106, enacted 
by L. 1975, ch. 150, § 4. 
75-3-705. Duty of personal representative—Inventory and appraise-
ment.—Within three months after his appointment, a personal repre-
sentative, who is not a special administrator or a successor to another 
representative who has previously discharged this duty, shall prepare 
an inventory of property owned by the decedent at the time of his 
death, listing it with reasonable detail, and indicating as to each 
listed item, its fair market value as of the date of the decedent's 
death, and the type and amount of any encumbrance that may exist 
with reference to any item. The personal representative shall send a 
copy of the inventory to interested persons who request i t He may also 
file the original of the inventory with the court. 
History: C. 1953, 75-3-705, enacted 
by L. 1975, ch. 150, § 4; L. 1977, ch. 194, 
§34. 
75-3-707- Duty of personal representative—Supplementary inven-
tory.—If any property not included in the original inventory comes 
to the knowledge ot a personal representative or if the personal repre-
sentative learns that the value or description indicated in the original 
inventory for any item is erroneous or misleading, he shall make a sup-
plementary inventory or appraisement showing the market value as 
of the date of the decedent's death of the new item or the revised 
market value or descriptions, and the appraisers or other data relied 
upon, if any, and file it with the court if the original inventory was 
filed, or furnish copies thereof or information thereof to persons in-
terested in the new information. 
History: C. 1953, 75-3-707. enacted 
by L. 1975, ch. 150, §4. 
75-3-715. Powers and duties of successor personal representative.—A 
successor personal representative has the same power and duty as the 
original personal representative to complete the administration and dis-
tribution of the estate, as expeditiously as possible, but he shall not 
exercise any power expressly made personal to the executor named in 
the will. 
History: C. 1953, 75-3-715, enacted 
by L. 1975, ch. 150, § 4. 
75-3-718. Compensation of personal representative and attorney.— 
When no compensation is provided by the will, or the personal represent-
ative renounces all claim thereto, he shall be entitled to reasonable com-
pensation for his services; provided, however, the compensation for a 
normal probate proceeding shall not exceed the sum of the following 
amounts of the probate estate: 
5% of the first $1,000; 
4% of the next $4,000; 
3% of the next $5,000; 
2% of the next $40,000; 
l l /2% of the next $50,000; and 
1% of the amount over $100,000. 
When no compensation is provided by will, or the attorney renounces 
all claim thereto, the attorney for the personal representative shall be 
entitled to reasonable compensation for his services; provided, however, 
the compensation for a normal probate proceeding shall not exceed the 
sum of the following amounts of the probate estate: 
5% of the first $20,000; 
4% of the next $40,000; 
3 % of the next $140,000; 
2Y2% of the next $550,000; 
2% of the next $750,000; and 
IY2Y0 of the balance. 
Such additional compensation may be allowed to the personal repre-
sentative and/or the attorney as the court may deem just and reasonable 
for any extraordinary services, including the filing of Federal estate tax 
r e t u r n -
H i s t o r y : C. 1953, 75-3-718, enacted by 
L. 1977, ch. 194, § 37. 
75-3-718- Compensation of personal representative and at-
torney.. 
(1) A personal representative and an attorney are entitled to reasonable 
compensation for their services, 
(2) If a will provides for compensation of the personal representative and 
there is no-contract with the decedent regarding compensation, he may re-
nounce the provision before qualifying and be entitled to reasonable compen-
sation. A personal representative also may renounce his right to all or any 
part of the compensation. A written renunciation of fee may be filed with the 
court. 
History: C. 1953, 75-3-718, enacted by L. acted by Laws 1977, ch. 194t § 37, setting out a 
1987, ch . 32, § L schedule of limitations on the compensation of 
Repea l s a n d Reenac tments . — Laws 1987, personal representatives and attorneys, and 
ch. 32, § 1 repeals former § 75-3-718, as en- enacts the present section 
75-3-719- Expenses in estate litigation.—If any personal represent-
ative or person nominated as personal representative defends or 
prosecutes any proceeding in good faith, whether successful or not, he 
is entitled to receive from the estate his necessary expenses and dis-
bursements, including reasonable attorneys' fees incurred. 
History: C. 1953, 75-3-719, enacted 
by L. 1975, ch. 150, §4. 
75-3-805. Classification of claims.—(1) If the applicable assets of 
the estate are insufficient to pay all claims in full, the personal repre-
sentative shall make payment in the following order: 
(a) Reasonable funeral expenses; 
(b) Costs and expenses of administration; 
(c) Debts and taxes with preference under federal law; 
(d) Reasonable and necessary medical and hospital expenses of the 
last illness of the decedent, including compensation of persons attending 
him; 
(e) Debts and taxes with preference under other laws of this state; 
(f) All other claims. 
(2) No preference shall be given in the payment of any claim over 
any other claim of the same class, and a claim due and payable shall not 
be entitled to a preference over claims not due. 
History: C. 1953, 75-3-805, enacted 
by L. 1975, ch. 150, § 4. 
75-3-808, Individual liability of personal representative.—(1) Un-
less otherwise provided in the contract, a personal representative is not 
individually liable on a contract properly entered into in his fiduciary 
capacity in the course of administration of the estate unless he fails to 
reveal his representative capacity and identify the estate in the contract. 
(2) A personal representative is individually liable for obligations 
arising from ownership or control of the estate or for torts committed in 
the course of administration of the estate only if he is personally at 
fault. 
(3) Claims based on contracts entered into by a personal representa-
tive in his fiduciary capacity, on obligations arising from ownership or 
control of the estate, or on torts committed in the course of estate ad-
ministration may be asserted against the estate by proceeding against 
the personal representative in his fiduciary capacity, whether or not the 
personal representative is individually liable therefor. 
(4) Issues of liability as between the estate and the personal repre-
sentative individually may be determined in a proceeding for account-
ing, surcharge, or indemnification or other appropriate proceeding. 
History: C- 1953, 75-3-80S, enacted 
by L, 1975, ciu 150, § 4. 
Rule 52. Findings by the court. 
(a) Effect In all actions tried upon the facts with-
out a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall 
find the facts specially and state separately its con-
clusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be en-
tered pursuant to Rule 58A; in granting or refusing 
interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set 
forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which 
constitute the grounds of its action. Requests for find-
ings are not necessary for purposes of review. Find-
ings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary 
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly errone-
ous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity 
of the trial court to judge the credibility of the wit-
nesses. The findings of a master, to the extent that 
the court adopts them, shall be considered as the find-
ings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of 
fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and re-
corded in open court following the close of the evi-
dence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of de-
cision filed by the court. The trial court need not en-
ter findings of fact and conclusions of law in rulings 
on motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b). The 
court shall, however, issue a brief written statement 
of the ground for its decision on all motions granted 
under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when the 
motion is based on more than one ground. 
(b) A m e n d m e n t Upon motion of a party made not 
later than 10 days after entry of judgment the court 
may amend its findings or make additional findings 
and may amend the judgment accordingly. The mo-
tion may be made with a motion for a new trial pur-
suant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made in 
actions tried by the court without a jury, the question 
of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the find-
ings may thereafter be raised whether or not the 
party raising the question has made in the district 
court an objection to such findings or has made either 
a motion to amend them, a motion for judgment, or a 
motion for a new trial. 
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions 
of law. Except in actions for divorce, findings of fact 
and conclusions of law may be waived by the parties 
to an issue of fact: 
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the 
trial; 
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause; 
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in 
the minutes. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
PART VIL 
JUDGMENT. 
Rule 54. Judgments; costs. 
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these 
rules includes a decree and any order from which an 
appeal lies. A judgment need not contain a recital of 
pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of 
prior proceedings. 
(o) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or in-
volving multiple parties. When more than one 
claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a 
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party 
claim, and or when multiple parties are involved, the 
court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to 
°
ne or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties 
f)nly upon an express determination by the court that 
t h e re is no just reason for delay and upon an express 
direction for the entry of judgment In the absence of 
such determination and direction, any order or other 
form of decision, however designated, which adjudi-
cates fewer than all the claims or the rights and lia-
bilities of fewer than all the parties shall not termi-
nate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and 
the order or other form of decision is subject to revi-
sion at any time before the entry of judgment adjudi-
cating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of 
all the parties. 
(c) Demand for judgment 
(1) Generally. Except as to a party against 
whom a judgment is entered by default, every 
final judgment shall grant the relief to which the 
party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, 
even if the party has not demanded such relief in 
his pleadings, it may be given for or against one 
or more of several claimants; and it may, when 
the justice of the case requires it, determine the 
ultimate rights of the parties on each side as be-
tween or among themselves. 
(2) Judgment by defaul t A judgment by de-
fault shall not be different in kind from, or ex-
ceed in amount, that specifically prayed for in 
the demand for judgment 
(d) Costs. 
(1) To whom awarded. Except when express 
provision therefor is made either in a statute of 
this state or in these rules, costs shall be allowed 
as of course to the prevailing party unless the 
court otherwise directs; provided, however, 
where an appeal or other proceeding for review is 
taken, costs of the action, other than costs in con-
nection with such appeal or other proceeding for 
review, shall abide the final determination of the 
cause. Costs against the state of Utah, its officers 
and agencies shall be imposed only to the extent 
permitted by law. 
(2) How assessed. The party who claims his 
costs must within five days after the entry of 
judgment serve upon the adverse party against 
whom costs are claimed, a copy of a memoran-
dum of the items of his costs and necessary dis-
bursements in the action, and file with the court 
a like memorandum thereof duly verified stating 
that to affiant's knowledge the items are correct, 
and that the disbursements have been necessar-
ily incurred in the action or proceeding. A party 
dissatisfied with the costs claimed may, within 
seven days after service of the memorandum of 
costs, file a motion to have the bill of costs taxed 
by the court in which the judgment was ren-
dered. 
A memorandum of costs served and filed after 
the verdict, or at the time of or subsequent to the 
service and filing of the findings of fact and con-
clusions of law, but before the entry of judgment, 
shall nevertheless be considered as served and 
filed on the date judgment is entered. 
(3), (4) [Deleted.] 
(e) Interest and costs to be included in the 
judgment The clerk must include in any judgment 
signed by him any interest on the verdict or decision 
from the time it was rendered, and the costs, if the 
same have been taxed or ascertained. The clerk must, 
within two days after the costs have been taxed or 
ascertained, in any case where not included in the 
judgment, insert the amount thereof in a blank left in 
the judgment for that purpose, and make a similar 
notation thereof in the register of actions and in the 
judgment docket. 
(Amended effective January 1, 19S5 » 
